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It is rare for an historian to be able to establish in great detail the life of any but 
those considered one of ‘the great and the good’. The unusual amount of documentary 
sources, both by, and about, Daniel Eccleston of Lancaster (1745-1821) provides an 
opportunity to explore aspects of Atlantic trade, the Industrial revolution and 
entrepreneurship through the experiences of an individual. Eccleston spent many years 
travelling round the Americas and trading in the West Indies before finally settling in 
England late in 1779 and establishing himself as a merchant. During his first two years 
business in the North West of England he sent 274 letters. These reveal patterns of 
business and familial networks showing how trust is ‘constantly produced and 
contested’ and that ‘emotions and attachments built through trade were often very 
strong’.2 The letters illustrate the ways he used trust-building activities and open 
networks to build, sustain, maintain and diversify his commercial activities and mitigate 
risk during conditions of Atlantic warfare as the industrial revolution was driving 
economic and social change. Eccleston needed to develop and exploit open networks 
because he failed to gain access to the formalized merchant organisations in Liverpool, 
where he initially intended to base his business. Ritter, Wilkinson and Johnston (2004) 
note the ability of a business ‘to develop and manage successfully its relationships with 
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other firms may be viewed as a core competence, which varies among firms’. 3  The 
specific challenges Eccleston faced were the impact of the ongoing wars on trans-
Atlantic trade and his status as a newcomer in the merchant community of North-west 
England. He needed access to scarce shipping and credit to overcome the problems 
caused by the ongoing war and gain access to networks that would support him in 
establishing himself as a merchant.  This paper addresses how he attempted to meet 
these challenges, identifying the importance of  open networks adopted by Eccleston 
part of a ‘bottom-up’ loosely coupled, integrated  system in which business and social 
relationships were co-produced by various actors to create mutual economic advantage 
in a high-risk trans-Atlantic business environment. 
4
  These networks were horizontally 
integrated, with movable power balances, dynamic and flexible; to reflect this they will 




This paper takes a case study approach to highlight Eccleston’s utilisation of 
iterative business activity in co-produced open, integrated networks. Eccleston’s 
network required relationship and network management skills to manage the paradoxes 
evident within the integrated network structure he developed.
6
 Network ties are 
important when starting a new venture as a means of mitigating the invisibility problem 
faced by a new business.
7
  The larger and stronger the network the better the chances of 
survival and strong performance in the early stages of a new venture, and the Eccleston 
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 The term kinetic network is thus shorthand for a bottom-up, co-produced, loosely-coupled and 
integrated network of the sort developed by Eccleston.  
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case confirms this to be as true in the past as it is today.
8
 Eccleston had a pre-existing 
network providing an initial platform on which he could build his new enterprise; there 
remains considerable debate about the significance of the role of existing networks in 
supporting the founder of a new venture. This is reflected in the work of Shane and 
Stuart (2002) and Hallen (2008) which in turn illustrate one of the paradoxes of 
network interactions highlighted by Håkansson
 
and  Ford (2002), that while special 
opportunities can result from good management of interactions a network can also be 
restrictive.
9
 In the case of Eccleston we see him limiting his use of family and co-
religionist (restrictive) networks in favour of a wider network. The network-
development choices made by Eccleston reflect his agency in network development, 
supporting the findings of Kilduff and Tsai (2005) that exploring actor-level differences 





This paper will therefore show how Eccleston’s successful negotiation of the 
process of building a kinetic network which enabled him to manage the risk of trans-
Atlantic trade by moving into the newly developing tertiary sector as a trusted actor in 
a co-produced and complex network. Eccleston’s management of relationships within 
the network  enabled him to promote his reputation as an honest dealer, develop lines 
of credit, minimize his transaction costs,  exploit his specialized market knowledge 
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and use insider information to develop new opportunities minimising risk for, as 
Pearson and Richardson (2001) state;  
It is not just the cost of transactions which is reduced by networking, but 
properly the costs of commercial information. Information costs entail both the 
costs of enforcing contacts and of monitoring moral hazard and free riding, but 
also many other costs embodied in determining business strategy, such as those 
of market research, of monitoring competition, and of appraising investment 
decisions’. 11 
Pearson and Richardson (2001) pointed to the need to explore less prominent members 
of urban networks during the industrial revolution, especially those who diversified 
out of core trading activities into other areas, particularly the burgeoning tertiary 
sector. Pearson and Richardson contend it is through such individuals and their 
activities the process of economic change can be best understood.
12
 Eccleston is an 
important case study in this category as his entrepreneurial activities take off as the 
first steam-powered mills and fully automated weaving process are heralding a period 
of rapid social change.
13
 Eccleston’s entrepreneurial journey indicates the ‘variegated 
influence of social structure on transactions’ as he attempted and failed to enter 
already established merchant networks in Liverpool.
 14
 Eccleston then transferred to 
the new port of Lancaster where he could proactively exploit his information- power 
as capital. He was able to exploit information gained from one part of the network to 
generate economic advantage for himself and business for the Lancaster underwriters 
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amongst his kinetic network.
15
 This is not to argue Eccleston (or any other person 
within his network) was in control of this network, as might be the case with a hub and 
spoke model or network. However, he was able to create or exploit situations 
beneficial to his economic interests through a series of multifaceted business 
adaptations relying on complex interlinked relationships and interactions.
16
 Although 
all the network actors had a role in co-producing the structure of the network, 
Eccleston was able to successfully exploit his place in the network through excellent 
relationship management, particularly when his expert knowledge enabled him to 
broker both insurance and build new relationships within his network, while when he 
was in a weaker position the network provided him with the expertise of others.
17
   
 
Eccleston was keenly aware of the limitations of his network, particularly one 
of the three network paradoxes noted by Håkansson and Ford (2002). 
18
 While trust 
played a pivotal role in the co-production of the network exploited by Eccleston, loss 
of trust caused emotional as well as business angst amongst the individuals.
 19
  In 
developing a network the management of relationships is perhaps more important than 
the management of the network itself, and trust was an essential tool for relationship 
building.
20
 Sabel, (1993) considered ‘that trust is a precondition of social life…Hence 
the proper question is not how trust can be created from mistrust, but how and whether 
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particular persons or relations come to be seen as trustworthy’ and as Haggerty (2012) 
notes ‘during the periods 1750-1815, there is no doubt personal trust was extremely 
important’.21  This is an important notion when considering how business and social 
relationships interacted to create mutual economic advantage at a time when trading 





The significance of trust and networks as proxies for organisational forms, tools 
for risk mitigation and means of developing social capital have been explored across 
disciplines, including economics, sociology, history and business studies. The seminal 
work of Granovetter (1973) on the strength of weak ties developed a sociological 
network theory setting out how micro-level interactions were fundamental to the 
‘diffusion of influence and information, mobility opportunity and community 
organisation’.23 Granovetter’s development of a weak-ties network model moved 
network theory on from models focussing on strong ties and well-defined social groups 
to one allowing for diverse patterns of relations between groups, encouraging analysis 
of ‘segments of social structure not easily defined in terms of primary groups’ as well 
as showing how weak ties could act as bridges to new networks, a strategy adopted by 
Eccleston with some success.
24
  Granovetter’s work indicates the bottom-up, co-
produced nature of the most successful bridging networks.
25
 However, in Eccleston’s 
case it is also important to consider the mutuality of the network relationship, and 
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herein lays another of the paradoxes identified by Hakansson & Ford (2002), Eccleston 
had to be both proactive and reactive, often within the same relationship; this required 
others trusted him, and he had a network of people he could trust.  Relationships within 
his network were fluid, with a position of knowledge or power in one letter reversed in 
another as he needed advice or support.  Trust building and maintenance by letter rather 
than face-to-face requires expertise in a range of areas including knowledge of the 
relevant topic, ideally knowledge not widely available but verifiable and which receives 
validation from others. It also requires consistency in communication and a level of 
eloquence and self-promotion.  The ability to network effectively is a skill not held by 
every businessperson.  Ritter, Wilkinson and Johnston (2004) note network 
development in many cases is ‘hindered by the lack of understanding of the 
construct’.26  Much literature on networks in business history accepts individuals and 
firms were part of familial or other networks facilitating their business interests and 
then proceeds to explore these networks without acknowledging the underpinning 
complexities of network building revealed in the letters of Eccleston.  
 
 
Within economic history there has been interest in the role of networks and trust 
covering familial, sectorial, regional and other types of network. In reviewing the 
literature relevant here the work of Casson (1995, 2003, 2011), Braudel, (1982) Sabel 
(1993), Williamson (1993), Maifreda (1998) Cookson (1998), Podolney and Page 
(1998), Rauch, (2001), Pearson and Richardson (2001) , Wilson and Popp (2003a; 
2003b) and most significantly Haggerty (2012) offer important insights into the ways in 
which economic behaviour in the late eighteenth century was supported by the 
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entrepreneurial activity of individuals coupled with their dynamic development of 
networks and trust generation activities.
27
  The interlinking of networks with trust 
building and reputational status of participating individuals is a common theme in 
economic history, with Haggerty’s (2012) conclusion networks were an integral part of, 
‘The business culture of eighteenth century merchants [which] therefore works as a 
private-order institution providing  an incentive structure of which trust was a part’ 
being implicitly supported across the literature.
28
  The debate remains nuanced with 
discussions about whether confidence and trust are two sides of the same coin explored 
in the work of Humphrey and Schmitz (1996) and considered by Haggerty to be 
substantially different concepts in the minds of merchants in the eighteenth century. 
29
 
Haggerty sees Casson’s (1995) analysis of networks as somewhat simplistic, noting he 
does not reflect on the fluidity of trust but rather sees this as a static concept, one which 
is earned and then remains stable, and not one prone to change as information and most 
particularly gossip (ever-prevalent even in business letters of the period) alters 
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  The significance of information and the power of an information 
giver to change the dynamics of trust in a network illustrate the complex and 
continually adapting nature of business and social interactions and indicate such 
networks are to an extent self-organising in response to the needs of the network actors 
at any particular time.
31
  Thus effective networks are predicated on being able to 
manage interactions and relationships effectively rather than an individual managing 
the network as an entity in itself.  
More recently the work of Pearson and Richardson (2001) showed how, during 
the Industrial revolution, there was a competitive market in which trust acted as a form 
of currency in a situation where large numbers of entrepreneurs were rivals; enabling 
entrepreneurs with an effective network of trust to develop their business interests 
rapidly. Basing their study on records covering a period of almost 50 years they showed 
how relations between individuals and ‘iterative business activity’ acted as the basic 
foundation of business networks, a point supported by the work of Wilson and Popp.
32
 
Pearson and Richardson argue this enabled the transformation of the British business 
landscape by paving the way for multilateral commercial arrangements through the 
development of capital networks amongst insurance investors.
 33
  Building capital 
networks clearly involves a high degree of trust and repeated contacts, as shown by 
Pearson and Richardson.   
 
The work of Casson remains critical in developing an exploration of the role of 
networks as a coordination mechanism within international business during the period 
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under consideration here. His work in illustrating the diversity of networks as well as 
stressing the importance of differentiating between the varying types and functions of 
networks allows for the effective characterisation of networks in economic history.
34
   
Wilson and Popp (2003a) noted the need to explore the economic and social 
environment in which networks are formed and develop.  They point to the significance 
of trust and power in developing further analysis of networks during the Industrial 
revolution, supporting the notion individual entrepreneurs exploited local, regional and 
international networks in order to gain advantages in terms of business intelligence, 
capital and credit. They note the role of ‘significant actors’ is critical in network 
building and maintenance, concluding; ‘it is not the network structure per se which is 
the key determinant of regional performance but instead the quality of the 
entrepreneurship for which networking serves as a vehicle.’35  Work on networks of  
trust and economic development was further developed by Smail (2003) exploring 
relationships between the economy and culture, providing additional important insights 
here, he comments; ‘lacking a comprehensive credit market the British economy was 
dependent on personal trust for all economic transactions.’36  Smail (2003) further 
argued the availability of credit through the trust engendered via a network of business 
contacts was what enabled entrepreneurial activity in the late eighteenth century. 
37
  
Podolney and Page (1998) suggested networks were critically important for information 
sharing (which in turn helped engender trust) enhancing an individual’s status through 
acknowledged membership of a network and particularly for the economic benefits they 
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could confer, a conclusion supported in the subsequent work of Pearson and Richardson 
(2001) and Haggerty (2012).
 38
 Haggerty additionally suggested the quasi-
organisational form facilitated by effective business networks meant, ‘Risk, trust, 
reputation obligation and networks were the ‘institutional elements’ of this successful 
business culture.’ 39 Further, Haggerty (2012) supports the conclusions of Pearson and 
Richardson that, ‘networking and the economy of regard in industrialising Britain 
stretched well beyond the reach of kinship relation and small partnerships’ noting non-
family contacts were the most useful in supporting network building. 
40
 However, 
simply having a large number of non-family contacts would not be enough alone for 
Eccelston to develop a successful business in the challenging business environment 
engendered by the trans-Atlantic war taking place, what he needed was a networking 
and relationship management ability allowing him to become a trusted actor within a 
reactive and proactive network within which he could connect his resources to those of 
others within the network, and it is for this reason the co-production of his network, by 





Daniel Eccleston (1745-1821) was born near Preston in Lancashire, and brought 
up as a Quaker; his Father was later an elder of the Whitehaven meeting in the northern 
county of Cumberland.  Eccleston left England aged 22, spending twelve years 
travelling round the Americas and trading in the West Indies before finally settling 
permanently in England late in 1779. In 1767 (aged 22) Eccleston began travelling 
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around the West Indies (Jamaica, Tobago, Barbados and Antigua being the most likely 
islands he would have visited); his older brother settled as a planter in Antigua. By 
1769 Eccleston was journeying between Montreal and Boston, he spent some time in 
Boston (acquiring a dog named Dominic) and left the town by the end of 1769. He then 
travelled through Virginia, and stayed with Washington at Mount Vernon some time in 
1770 or 71 and also travelled on the Mississippi. His travels on the American mainland 
ended in New York, which he left in the spring of 1772, sailing to Antigua. Eccleston 
spent eighteen months in Antigua and then six months in Barbados, where he entered 
into a partnership with Edward West, attorney. He then travelled to Lancaster, arriving 
in the early summer of 1774. He sailed from Lancaster in 1776, and then remained in 
Barbados until the late summer of 1779. He arrived back in Whitehaven at Christmas 
1779 and settled in Liverpool until April 1781, after which he moved to Lancaster, 
earning a living as a merchant and insurance broker but was also an inventor, coin 
designer and distributor, radical thinker, author and scientist. He lived on Queen Street 
until his death in 1821. There is no record of his ever registering his presence at any 
Quaker meeting houses upon his return to England and he was later formally expelled 
from the Quakers. Eccleston was active in radical politics, opposed to the established 
church, an inventor and keen amateur scientist with an interest in electricity 
generation.
42
  Smail noted; ‘historical actor[s] rarely make explicit the cultural 
assumptions on which they act’ but in the case of Eccleston his underpinning 
philosophies come through even in the business letters composed during his first two 





 The 274 letters in two copybooks offer a manageable source for evidence 
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of network formation; trust and relationship building activities and risk management in 




The advantage of looking at the two letter books as a unit is their completeness; 
letter books were the primary tool of the man of business, they were admissible as 
evidence in court and provided not only details of correspondence but also detail prices 
paid or received, local wages, a summary of credit outstanding and cash balances held 
over the two years under consideration here. Unfortunately, we do not have the replies 
to these letters, although comments in subsequent letters answer some questions other 
issues remain unresolved.  Nevertheless, we can see the mutuality of the network in 
which business and social relationships were co-produced to strengthen the economic 
position of the network actors in particular nodes.  
 
All bar one of the letters in the copybooks are business related even where they 
are to family members. Letters to his father are the single largest group of letters, but 
these comprise only 8 percent of the total. Working with the letters as a unit allowed the 
network to be visualized in several ways. A flat-file database was initially constructed, 
showing details such as recipient, mode of delivery (via friend-in-common, ship’s 
captain, pacquet boat, mail coach etc), and enabled the size of the network after two 
years to be established at 87 individual correspondents with mention made within 
letters of an additional 34 contacts. Using these techniques allowed the mapping of 
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Eccleston’s letters in order to unravel the links between communication, enterprise, 
networks and changing business models as an approach to managing a business in a 
time of global crisis. 
46
  It also allowed sub-networks to be identified as per Haggerty 
and Haggerty (2013) showing family was not the most significant of Eccleston’s 
networks, and sub-networks, such as his regional network of manufacturers, were of 
significant importance, alongside his Antigua / Barbados network of planters and 
agents.
47
  Rauch (2001) concluded the significance of family, kinship and ethnic 
networks to the development of international trade may have been overstated because 
they are more easily evidenced in the historic record.  As a Quaker Eccleston had the 
potential to maintain family and meeting house links in building his business, but it is 
noticeable Eccleston’s business correspondence with family members rapidly tailed 
off.
48
  It may be he had already been informally excluded from Quaker networks 
through the processes of social exclusion noted by Ackrill and Hannah (2001) with 
which the Quakers encouraged compliance with their norms and values; Eccleston 
clearly did not comply with these in terms of attendance at meetings or belief in the 
Trinity. He may have also objected to the close financial oversight many Quaker 
meetings imposed on members in business.
49
  The letters illustrate how, through careful 
development of a non-family network, built through initial contact by letter, made on 
his arrival back in England via ‘friends-in-common’, he was able to create his own 
‘Extensive local networks for the mobilisation of finance, talent or information’ to 
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create mutual economic advantage.
50
  Mapping out his network enabled questions to be 
asked of the qualitative data such as levels of activity of various elements over time and 
the effects of events such as the loss of the West Indies fleet or the devastating 





The development of networks and associated trust-building in a trans-Atlantic 
context in the early 1780s was made considerably more difficult by the on-going sea-
based war. Pre-war trading networks were disrupted; Eccleston had certainly been 
trading through New York just before the start of the war, but these contacts were lost 
to him for a considerable period.  His plan to export high-value goods aimed at wealthy 
women in the West Indies and import spirits, cotton and his brother’s crop of sugar was 
predicated both on the ability to exploit existing networks in the West Indies but also 
being able to generate a supply network in Great Britain. As he had not lived in Great 
Britain since 1774, and then for less than a year, he would have to rapidly build 
sufficient reputation to be able to obtain credit and to also secure sufficient, fast 
shipping space for his goods. Shipping space was a particular issue as the Royal Navy 
was commandeering merchant ships and, through the impressment of ‘men of seafaring 
habit aged between 18 and 45 years’, diminishing the supply of skilled sailors for 
merchant shipping who were thus able to command a higher wage due to scarcity. 
52
 
Additionally, the long-established Merchants Societies in Liverpool (such as the West 
India Association) were able to work as a cartel to monopolize limited shipping space 
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on the valuable trans-Atlantic routes. The merchants’ societies may be viewed as a top-
down, formalized network with clearly articulated rules and hierarchies supporting 
established ways of doing business. Eccleston rapidly realized he needed a different 
type of network, one more open and bottom-up, integrating his expertise and 
knowledge alongside his business interests.  
 
In exploring how Eccleston managed to build and exploit his network outside of 
established and formalized merchants’ networks in Liverpool, it was important to 
understand the wider social context within which any entrepreneur of the period was 
working. Using the analytical model proposed by Haggerty and Haggerty (2013) the 
complexity of Eccleston’s network and its inter-relationships can be seen.53 He made 
early use of his family (Quaker) network, which comprised primarily his father, a linen 
weaver and Quaker elder in Whitehaven in the county of Cumberland and his brother 
Isaac, a planter in Antigua although he also conducted some commissions on behalf of 
three cousins in Whitehaven (the Weller family) and a cousin in Thistleton, Lancashire 
(Thomas Butler). His network of trusted close friends was important to Eccelston, and 
he maintained regular contact with this group, providing advice and looking out for 
their interests. In England these were for the most part younger men, fond of drinking 
and partying.  Eccleston’s most eclectic and amusing letters are to this group, although 
sadly some of the ‘in’ jokes are beyond interpretation. One of Eccleston’s closest 
friends, Thomas Park, who bore the nickname Tummus a Didimus (doubting Thomas), 
was the recipient of a letter which, after a cursory discussion of cotton, described an 
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impromptu drinking party after a visit to Glasson, about six miles south of Lancaster, to 
see the new pier: 
54
 
We got to drinking Liverpool Ale aboard the old hulk, and did it pretty freely, 
but not satisfied with that, must call at Condor Green in coming home, where 
several trials ensued, and the upright being once judge and twice on the jury, of 
course you may be sure brought in damages, which with the Ale we drank on 




During the ride back to Lancaster, Eccleston fell from his horse and damaged his 
shoulder, which is perhaps indicative of the amount and potency of the Liverpool ale 
they drank. The evidence of positive relationships which were occasionally face-to-face 
but sustained by letter is evident throughout the correspondence, and chimes with the 
finding of Haggerty (2012), while the co-produced nature of the network is seen 
through the reciprocal nature of both the social and business activities, with Eccelston 
offering a ‘warm fire and a rarebit’ to his Liverpool cronies when next they did 
business with him in Lancaster.
56
 Eccleston also moved in influential circles, and was 
close friends with both the Rawlinson family, including the local MP, and also leading 
recusant family, the Blundell’s of Crosby, whom he visited on several occasions, 
although he did not make use of these contacts for business purposes. Eccleston’s other 
sub-networks can be categorized as comprising attorneys based in the West Indies 
(these were not lawyers, but rather represented an individual’s interests in business), 
ship owners, fellow merchants, clients and creditors, small traders, plus medium and 
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larger manufacturers in the industrial heartlands of Manchester, Sheffield, Stoke-on- 





















In developing his role in the network with potential clients and suppliers initial 
contact was followed by the sharing of information on sales prices, the potential sugar 
and cotton harvests, new factories, bankruptcies, trustworthy contacts on whom bills-
of-exchange could be drawn (and less-trustworthy ones whose bills should be returned), 































Figure 1: Eccleston’s Network and its Relationships 
Dotted line indicates ‘bonding’ 







opportunities for new business.  He consolidated his place in the network through 
business trips to manufacturers and extensive use of social meetings, all of which 
helped engender trust in Eccleston amongst the network. These are conventional 
relationship management techniques still in use today, but for Eccleston the benefit of 
the network at a time when knowledge travelled slowly was providing him with a 
means of managing risk, recovering from adversity, spotting new opportunities and 
enabled him to rapidly change his strategy in order to develop as an entrepreneur in a 
fast-moving business environment.  
 
By the early 1780s and through their regular meetings Quakers became 
tantamount to a religious-commercial society with a network reaching across the oceans 
and into the colonies.
57
  However, Eccleston was no ordinary Quaker, so perhaps it is 
not surprising 67 percent (186) of his letters were sent to people not in any way related 
to him, and not linked through the community of Friends. In contrast to the Quaker 
practice of ending business letters with the greeting, ‘yr. loving friend’ Eccleston 
invariably signed off with a profession of obedience and servitude which knowledge of 
his personality reveals to be a graceful platitude.
 58
  He also wrote letters to non-
Quakers using the conventional ‘you’ and ‘yours’ rather than the Quaker form of  
‘thou’ and ‘thine’ with which he addressed his family and Quaker associates. Thus it is 
noticeable Eccleston was at ease with two languages: one of his upbringing, the other of 
society in general.  
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As a result of his travels Eccleston had extensive and well-developed networks 
throughout the American mainland, Portugal and the West Indies. The political 
situation meant he could not maintain his contacts on the American mainland, as can be 
seen in figure 2. However, he rapidly made use of friends-in-common to expand his 
networks in England on his arrival in Liverpool in December 1779. By February 1780 
Eccleston was living in rooms, a common practise amongst bachelors of the period, at 
Mrs Bare’s establishment, 9, Temple Street, Liverpool.59  Eccleston became firm 
friends with other men of similar disposition lodging there, who by virtue of their 
ability to hold their wine were collectively known as ‘The Uprights’; this group 
provided him with contacts across the region. 
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Figure 2 Distribution of Eccleston's contacts by distance 
 
Figure 2 shows how important a regional network (greater than 25 miles from his home 
city, but less than 100 miles away) became to Eccleston. Many of the contacts within 
this regional network were made after Eccleston arrived back in England and 
contributed significantly to his business development, especially his move into 
insurance brokerage.  
 
Casson (2011) demonstrates the difficulties of engineering trust over long 
distances or when networks were dispersed, giving as his example the case of long 
distance trade in high-value goods; the trading model selected by Eccleston.
 60 61
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Casson (2011) proposes the difficulties of developing and maintaining trust is mitigated 
by the ability to manage networks so trust is developed in smaller, ‘bonding’ networks 
which facilitates the management of more dispersed networks.
62
 By early 1781 over 70 
percent of Eccleston’s business contacts were outside of his family or co-religionists, 
based on his own networking activities with inter-linked bonding networks important in 





Figure 1 shows the structure of Eccleston’s network by the end of 1781, with the dotted 
lines marking out his ‘bonding’ network, which was highly permeable, allowing him to 
include new, but trusted, contacts within the group of business friends. That a 
significant proportion of his business network was made up of people who had clearly 
become his friends is important in understanding the bottom-up nature of his network 
building. This model could only work where friendship was part of the process; 
friendship is an important social construct engendering high levels of trust. However, 
the network also provided a means of acting against those who did not fulfil the norms 
and values of the network, as can be seen in several cases where bills were 
dishonoured, goods were not as expected or invoices were not paid. 
64
 In contrast to the 
findings of Stobart (2008) this work draws conclusions similar to those of Pearson and 
Richardson (2001) and Forestier (2010) that kinship ties were less important in 
developing business relationships by the late eighteenth century and networks acted 
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almost as an organisational form, helping minimize risk.
65
 Slightly adapting the seminal 
definition of network governance developed by Jones, Hesterly and Borgotti (1997) we 
see through Eccleson’s papers a ‘select, persistent, and structured set of autonomous 
[individuals and] firms… engaged in creating products or services based on implicit 
and open-ended contracts to adapt to environmental contingencies and to coordinate 
and safeguard exchanges. These contracts are socially-not legally-binding.’66  
Eccleston’s business network was male, middle class, convivial and closely tied to 
Whig politics, often Foxite in nature. Political pamphlets were sometimes enclosed in 
business letters, chiming with Guttridge’s  conclusion that ‘the driving force of 
Whiggism in and out of parliament, was, in large measure, the energy of the financial 
and commercial classes, linked closely with religious dissent’67  Eccleston’s network  
allowed information to travel, new connections to be made and tested, and older 
connections strengthened and reinforced in such a way it was far more than simply a 
means to facilitate standard business transactions. The network provided a mechanism 
of exchange governance as proposed by Diederen and Jonkers (2001), who note; 
‘relations transcend the immediate business context’.68 Eccleston’s papers show how 
trust was built between members of the network through exchange of reliable and 
timely information  which allowed for such services as reciprocal policing of unpaid 
bills, agreements to work as partners for one-off ventures (such as hiring a ship by eight 
members of his network for a round-trip to Antigua) and the rapid development of new 
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business opportunities as ways of both mitigating risk and benefitting from 
opportunities provided by the war (marine insurance brokerage).  This fits well with the 
definition developed by Jones, Hesterly and Borgotti (1997) who note ‘formal contracts 
may exist between some pairs of members’ but in informal networks mechanisms based 
upon  ‘collective sanctions and reputation’ take priority over official regulation and 
legal enforcement.
69
 The loosely-coupled structure of Eccleston’s network meant there 
was a degree of flexibility not enabled by the more formal partnership of a firm; the 
network allowed Eccleston to choose whether and how to enforce a debt or which 
person in the network to invite to join him in his various business ventures, meaning he 




The late eighteenth century networks Daniel Eccleston worked within were built 
on a range of social conventions, so although serving a primarily business or business 
/political purpose the commonly-held social constructions of the period were 
fundamental to the working of these networks. Eccleston developed business-to-
business trust based on an assessment of factors: esteem of the community, shared 
values, apparent liquidity, independence of thought, possession of knowledge and 
number of points of contact (friends-in-common).  His refusal to do business with those 
who did not measure up to his norms and values was rapid and scathing: 
If Jos. Morrismond calls on thee, thou may tell him it’s a matter of the utmost 
indifference to me, whether he’s suffered or pleased, that when I give him 
permission to draw on me I’ll honour his bills, but not before.71  
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Eccleston’s use of networks of friends-in-common who provided information on prices, 
trends and trade often allowed him to make links from separate items of 
correspondence; using information as a business planning tool helped him minimize 
risk. As Pearson and Richardson (2001) have shown: ‘The cost of making mistakes 
when diversifying into new activities and entering new markets was likely to have been 
reduced by information sharing and collective action between capitalists.’72  
Eccleston’s new venture was based on his observation of a developing consumerism in 
the colonies, especially amongst women, for what Berg (1999) has described as ‘semi-
luxuries’. 73 His decision fits well with Hoppit’s (2002) assertion that while numbers of 
merchants were relatively limited across Britain in comparison with other forms of 
trade, the most successful merchants were those who specialized as this allowed them 
to open up wider markets and to generate efficiencies of distribution.
74
 Coming from 
the north-west of England himself and with family living in the region Eccleston was 
well aware of the rapid development of the west-coast ports and also the burgeoning 
production of luxury goods (fabrics, china, silverware) in the Potteries, Manchester and 
Sheffield. Regional ports had more warehousing space available and were cheaper than 
London;  
‘Your Mr Wilson says he thinks them [the commission charged in London] very 
extravagant (I think they deserve a much worse appellation)... [in Liverpool] 
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several of the charges wouldn’t have been one tenth what they are and others 
entirely omitted.’ 75  
Furthermore the regional ports were accessible from the manufacturing areas on a 
developed canal network offering the opportunity to move goods from point of 
manufacture to the new ports at a reasonable rate and with the expectation of safe 
arrival.   
 
Eccleston made it clear in a number of letters he intended remaining in England, 
‘Till these wars & rumours of wars are over’.76  Whether by good fortune or 
perspicacity Eccleston had chosen the right moment to leave the West Indies; after his 
departure the situation in the region worsened rapidly as the French captured more 
British islands. His initial decision to settle in Liverpool must be seen in the light of his 
description of the city as ‘a land flowing with milk and honey’.77  In 1779 ‘Liverpool’s 
mercantile connections were… local, regional, national, and international’ the city was 
already part of an established and extensive trade network; an excellent choice for 
anyone wanting to trade across the Atlantic.
78
  Liverpool had a far better inland 
infrastructure than Cumberland where Eccleston’s parents were living.  The Duke’s 
Canal made access to Manchester straightforward and predictable and the city linked to 
a reasonably well-maintained network of turnpike roads.  
 
Eccleston’s first letters from Liverpool in 1780 were to friends, family and 
business contacts in the West Indies, containing news of his arrival in Britain, and the 
progress of other ships in the fleet with which he sailed as well as his inclusion in each 
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of his letters a request to be recommended as a trustworthy and reliable agent for 
planters in the West Indies: 
If any of your friends are inclinable to ship Cotton or any other produce, I flatter 
myself I can execute a commission of that kind as much to their advantage as 
most houses [in Liverpool], and will be obliged to you for anything you may 
recommend in that line. 
79
 
It is here we see how closely the business and friendship network intertwined in 
eighteenth-century commerce for Eccleston had considerable sums of money due to 
him from Barbados and Antigua; amounting to more than £150 in addition to the bills 
he had procured prior to his departure and which would fund his start-up costs in Great 
Britain.  As well as maintaining his existing network to provide a basis for his new 
venture as a merchant Eccleston had to develop contacts with suppliers in England for 
the luxury goods he intended exporting and contend with an effective closed-shop 
operating amongst existing Liverpool merchants. Eccleston often referred to problems 
in sending shipments to the West Indies as a result of the appropriation of space he 
thought he had secured by others whose cargoes had arrived more promptly at dockside 
or who had influential contacts.
80
  Eccleston’s failure to gain admittance to the 
Liverpool West Indies Association lay behind his eventual decision at the end of 1780 
to relocate to the fourth largest port in the UK, the rapidly expanding Lancaster.
81
 For 
those without the necessary connections to gain access to closed, elite networks the 
ability to become part of a kinetic network wherein actors have a high degree of 
autonomy is useful. If you can then use relationship management strategies to support 
the navigation of the paradoxes of this type of network then you are more likely to be 
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successful.  Eccleston set about using his network as a means of sharing capital 
resources to produce mutual economic advantage and resolve his shipping problems; 
purchasing the lease on a ship from Joseph Harrison of Whitehaven.
82
 Whilst Eccleston 
proceeded with the leasing of a vessel as a short-term solution to the shipping shortage, 
he continued to plan for the long term, and wrote to a business contact in Barbados: 
I am now fixed in Liverpool and have some tho’ts of purchasing a vessel to be 
constantly in the Trade from hence to your island; cou’d wish to have her about 
half owned here and half in Barbadoes; and shall be glad, if it is agreeable for 
you to take an eight share. I can purchase and fit her out for about £800 and 
shall have two or three considerable houses here who are shippers to your Island 
concerned, so that I shall have no doubt of sending her out from hence a full 
vessel, and wou’d hope for yours and the rest of the ownery’s Assistance in 
Barbadoes to have her also generally return full laden hence… If the above 
proposal meets with your approbation you’ll please give me instructions who I 




This letter offers an insight into the use of friendship and business networks in 
combining both to finance shipping and to ensure the space was well-used. Eccleston 
did not intend the owners of the ship would necessarily also be producers of goods to 
be shipped, but rather they would use their own networks to acquire goods for passage 
to Liverpool. In the same letter to his West Indies contacts Eccleston requested a 
remittance due to him to him for the bale of ‘oznabys’ he had sent out. This should be 
sent in ‘coarse clayed sugar’s’ or ‘good muscovado’.84 The current sale price of such 
                                                 
82
 LLSC MS 3734, Eccleston to Alexander Spittal, Whitehaven 9 Feb. 1780 
83





sugar in Liverpool was included in the letter.  He requested the remittance be sent by 
the 1st August convoy at the latest (before the hurricane season), meaning Eccleston 
was not likely to receive his remittance until December 1780, nine months after 
despatch of the goods, a somewhat faster rate of payment than generally the case with 
‘planters credit’ of between eighteen months to three years.85  One of the hazards of 
Atlantic trade, even without a global war, was extended credit was usual and payment 
in goods meant changes in duty or market prices could have a detrimental impact on a 
business, one which had been exacerbated for contacts in Eccleston’s network by losses 
to shipping. As Sperling (1962) noted, in times of war ‘very likely trade would have 
halted without bills of exchange’.86  Eccleston preferred Bills of Exchange over 
remittances in goods; by the end of 1780 Eccleston only offered his brother Isaac in 
Antigua the option of sending goods, every other person he traded with was asked to 
settle via a bill of exchange.  
 
It is apparent from Eccleston’s letters he was ‘one for the ladies’, and this may 
have inspired him to deal mainly in high-value consumer goods in demand amongst 
English women in the West Indies.
87
 These goods required little shipping space and 
could take a high mark-up; increasing profitability to Eccleston. Furthermore, such 
items could be sold to local retailers in the West Indies for cash, enabling remittances to 
be sent by bill of exchange.  Eccleston’s initial orders to manufacturers on his arriving 
in Liverpool included fifty pieces of patterned cotton fabric (the patterns were to be 
small) and £30.00 worth of fashionable hats, each individual hat to cost between 5/- and 
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He also ordered a considerable quantity of bunting (ribbon) in assorted colours 
from a manufacturer in Warrington.
89
 Later orders included decorated combs (for 
putting up hair), and mirrors, fashion plates (illustrations of fashionable costume), 
costume jewellery, wallpaper and sprig muslin.
90
  Eccleston’s familiarity with the 
hazards to which soft goods might be exposed to on the voyage is apparent, for he 
commented he would have the items securely re-packed in Liverpool, ensuring the 




Eccleston used other means to strengthen his network and improve its 
effectiveness. Whenever anyone of consequence from the Caribbean, no matter how 
remote the connection, visited the north-west of England, Eccleston visited them. This 
seems to have been common practice amongst overseas traders. The visit was reported 
in correspondence with the islands and to his network in England. The new 
acquaintance would carry letters and commissions back to the West Indies. Eccleston 
also included overseas visitors in his business trips; introducing them to contacts such 
as MPs, manufacturers and traders.
92
 Such trips allowed him to highlight the level of 
trust with which he was regarded both in England and the West Indies and enabled him 
to include a wider range of actors in his self-organising network as well as providing 
him with a degree of control over which interactions took place amongst those in his 
network. Eccleston showed a strong degree of strategic thinking in network and 
relationship management which is important in understanding how a kinetic network 
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can be used as a tool for ‘value creation and delivery’ by entrepreneurs.93  Nevertheless, 
for Eccleston, and perhaps for many of his contemporaries, knowing an individual was 
personally trustworthy was sometimes insufficient grounds for inclusion in his business 
network. The factors influencing Eccleston’s decision making regarding his network 
are especially evident in Eccleston’s reply to his old friend and drinking partner, Joseph 
Jordan of Bridgetown, who requested Eccleston ship goods to him on commission. 
Eccleston responded graciously, but firmly: 
I wou’d ship you the goods as soon as any person in Barbadoes but your Invo’ 
will amount to four or five hundred pounds, and the uncertainty of Remittances 
arriving safe at these precarious times, deters me from venturing anything 
material abroad at present, besides I wou’d beg leave to observe, the 
commission of 2½ pcent is not an object worth any persons while giving credit 
for at so great a distance from home, whatever I risked that way shou’d choose 
to send it on my own account in hopes of something more considerable.
94
  
Williamson (1985) emphasized international trade was a cycle of political and 
economic exchange relations, highlighting a wide range of social and political factors 
affecting trade; this was clearly the case for Eccleston.
95
 The cycle of political relations 
was not favourable for trade across the Atlantic and the range of political factors 
affecting trade was far greater in uncertain times. To a large degree the number and 
type of networks to which an individual belonged had a bearing on the extent to which 
the hazards surrounding trade could be negotiated successfully.  Williamson (1999) 
noted organization (of individuals by individuals) was the solution to many of the 
problems of trade caused by social and political factors; ‘Specifically, the cognitive 
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limits and contractual hazards to which human actors are subject are relieved by 
specialization and governance, respectively’.96 Eccleston’s networks were informal, and 
not subject to any official type of governance. However, unwritten contractual 
obligations were honoured, and friendship among the network actors provided for a 
form of governance which was powerful in ensuring norms and values were 
maintained.  Friendship was part of the trust-building and trust-maintenance allowing 
successful networks to be established and developed even during times of political and 
social upheaval.
97
  Eccleston’s trading and diverse network of contacts allowed him and 
his network to benefit socially and economically from a loose form of organization, 
built on trust.  Using a network method of organization has advantages over more 
formalized, bureaucratic structures, in allowing different parts of the network to be 
accessed for different purposes, which helps rapid responses to problems be developed.  
 
Despite the difficulties of trading with a war zone Eccleston would have made a 
handsome profit from his first two years trading in England. He achieved a turnover of 
more than £2,400 on his Atlantic trade in his first twenty months in Britain, and in 
addition had income from trade in England, his new insurance brokerage business, 
established in 1781and from his developing Baltic and Mediterranean trade. As a result 
of the hurricane in Barbados in 1780 Eccleston changed his business strategy, focussing 
instead on the tertiary sector and insurance brokerage after moving from Liverpool to 
the smaller, but thriving,  port of Lancaster; 
Have since then commenced Insura. Broker, A business by which I’m informed 
3 or 4 hundred pounds a year has been obtained here; and I hope to make £100 
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to a £150 or perhaps more, without running any risk or employing any capital. 




Eccleston knew insurance  was a profitable area of investment and decided brokerage 
would reduce his business risks while at the same time allowing him to benefit from the 
estimated £30,000 profits the underwriters in Lancaster were expecting to make if the 
Jamaica and Windward fleet arrived safely back in port (they did).
99
 The ability to 
move from one type of business to another untrammelled by regulation and without the 
need of large amounts of capital has to have been a significant factor behind the rapid 
expansion of trade and industry in the late eighteenth century but this ability was 
clearly facilitated by the existence of a well-established network of trust. Eccleston was 
trusted to broker marine insurance because he was known to have previous experience 
as an underwriter, was known to have successfully traded across the Atlantic in difficult 
times, was known to honour his bills of exchange and to settle accounts and most 
importantly was known to be part of a successful network supporting the norms and 




This paper has illustrated the role of kinetic networks as a tool for managing 
risk and developing mutual economic advantage, showing entrepreneurs in the late 
eighteenth century could be successful even during global war if they could accurately 
predict market trends, negotiate around closed networks, collect money owed without 
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recourse to the legal system and respond rapidly to changing circumstances. Managing 
these things required an effective network of knowledge sharing and mutual support. 
Eccleston and his contemporaries were part of an extremely complex trust-based 
network society. The commercial networks of Eccleston’s period were nurtured and 
nourished over time, providing the stability and security, fostering continued 
commercial growth. The role of trust as glue holding networks together; an ‘economy 
of regard’, is an additional element, important even today, but for merchants in the late 
eighteenth century it was a vital adjunct to the information provided by the networks to 
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